




























                               Xrmtvoduetgorm
Unti} the twentieth century Korea managed a fine ba}ancing act between more powerfu}
neighbours retaixxing its owxx identity and borders. Similar to these neighbovkrs, the
`Hermit Kingdom' pursvged a policy of isolationism which only ended when Westem
civilisation forced opexx the doors.
   The twentieth centvgry witnessed ca}amitous changes for Korea. First, it suffered the
humiiiation of becoming a Japanese co}oxxy from 1910 to 1945. Secoxxd, defeat of Japaxx
in X945 did not bring about a restoration of Koreaxx independence axxd territorial
integrity, instead Co}d War poiitics divided the country ixxto itorth and sovgth along the
thirty-eighth parallel, leading to a bloody civi} war from X950 to X953 which achieved
xxothing territoria}}y, }eaving behind oniy death axxd economic devastatioit.
   From the ashes of the Korean War an `economic miracle' took place. The sovgth,
with massive financia} heip from the United States, in particvgiar, set about econemic
reconstrvgction, adopting a developmenta} state mode} similar to Japan's. However,
unlike Japan where the military was reduced to a svkbordinate role, the Korean War and
fragi}ity of xxationa} security led to the rise of a powerfvgl military which eventually
seized power in 1961. k was the military regime of Park Chung Hee which becavgse of
its dictatorial grip oxx the covgntry was able to implement a policy of rapid
ixxdvkstrialisatioxx transforming a predomixxantly agricukural ecoxxomy into a leading,
high}y urbanised, indvgstria} state in a little over three decades.
   industrialisatioit and emergence as a leading actor ixx the globai economy also
brovgght about political change with the replacement of military rule by a civilian
administration in the early 1990s aitd a greater democratisatioit of poiitical aitd sociai
structures.
   By the mid 1990s the South Korean success story was on a par if not greater than
the Japanese one. Similar to the Japanese, spoik by decades of economic success, the
rea}ity of the impending economic crisis of 1997 fai}ed to register even in the higher
echelons of power uxxti} it was too late. The subsequent collective humiliation fek of an
international Monetary Fuitd bai}ovgt had a major psychological impact on the Koreait
nation as a whole from which it is still coming to terms with.
   in this paper I wiil briefly discuss the immediate causes which ied to the financiai
crisis of X997 and then axxalyse pre-crisis politica} axxd economic developments as we}} as
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extema} factors which contributed to the events of X997.
                        Tke X997 Finarmegal CrcisEs
The immediate causes of the financia} crisis of 1997 caxx be put down to the accumulative
effect of three key factors: the high ratio of short-term foreigxx loans, the high profiie
bankruptcies of some leading chaebol and the domino effect of the South-East Asian
fiitaxxciai crisis.
   Companies had borrowed heavi}y from financial institvgtions to pvgrsue aggressive
expansionary policies to enhance competitiveness. They had a}so gone for quick aitd easy
profits by investments in rea}-estate and stock-market speculation. The average gearing
ratio of many ieading chaebol was almost four hvkxxdred percent at 3.87 which compared
very vgnfavourably with the average debt-eqvgity ratio of O.85 in Taiwaxx, 2.0 in Japaxx
and 1.6 in the United States, leaving Koreaxx firms high}y vvklnerable to the vagaries of
economic factors ovgtside their contro}.
   As a result domestic financial institvktions which had borrowed money from foreigxx
banks on a short-term basis to finance corporate expansion were themselves
overstretched. In January 1997, a }eadixxg chaebol, Hanbo Steei, declared baitkruptcy, the
first in a decade, after the govemment was vgnable to bail out the company becavgse of
its huge debts. This vgnnerved both financiai ixxstitutions and markets since the belief
was strong that chaebol were `too big to fal}'.
   After the high-profile baitkruptcy of yet another chaebol, Kia Motors, confidence in
the Sovgth Korean economy started to crumble. Foreign credit rating agencies such as
Standard and Poor began to dowitgrade South Korea's overall creditworthiness.
Domestic commercial and merchaxxt banks were suddenly faced with a }iqvgidity crisis
cavgsed by the nexx-performing }oans and their own imability to borrow from abroad. The
banks en masse began to call in their }oans and svgspended axxy further borrowixxg. This
triggered more bankrvkptcies, vgndermining confidence fvkrther ixx the South Koreaxx
ecoxxomy.
   At the same time in Sovkth-east Asia a fvgil-blown economic crisis began to vknfo}d in
July. The economies of South-east Asia had pegged their currencies to the US do}lar
resuking in their over-vaiuation and making their exports iess competitive as the doiiar
strengthened. The perceived weakness of the economies }ed to specvglation on the
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exchange markets axxd the collapse first of the Thai baht axxd then one by one other
cvkrrencies in the region as the herd mentality took over aitd investors began to sel}
their holdings.
   By November, the Sovkth Korean govemment had no choice bvgt to ask the Wor}d
Bank and IMF to help it out of its ecoxxomic crisis with the largest bailout in history,
a major humiliatioxx for a country which had prided itself in its economic svkccess story.
   These three factors a}one do not explain why the crisis happened since the rea}
econemy at the time was in a reiativeiy sound state compared to other countries which
experienced fixxancial crises. The current account deficit had been significantly reduced
from the previous year, 1.9 percent of GDP compared to 4.8 percent, much }ower thait
countries such as Mexico and Thailand which averaged eight percent at the time of their
crises. Inflation was fairly stable at 4.4 percent. Most of the South Koreaxx borrowings
were in tradab}e sectors rather than real estate. The anxxvgal budget had been in balaxxce,
the pvgb}ic debt amovknting to oniy three percent of GDP, the best amoitg OECD
countries. The foreign debt was arouxxd twenty-five percent at the time of the crisis,
mvgch lower than the Wor}d Bank threshold of forty-eight percent. The debt service
ratio was 5.4 percent in 1995 and 5.8 percent in 1996, well below the benchmark of
eighteen percent aitd much }ower thait Mexico (24.2), indonesia (30.9) and Thailand (10.2)
in X995. Even short-term debt had dropped from 58.2 percent at the end of X996 to fifty-
eight percent oxx the eve of the crisis in Jvkxxe 1997.
   To uxxderstaxxd why the crisis occurred, a closer ana}ysis of the pre-crisis ecoxxomic
and politicai developments as we}1 as other external factors is necessary.
                        The ChaeboR and Laboerar
Cooperatioxx between government, ixxdvkstry, fixxancial institvktioxxs aitd the bureaucracy
through implementation of a rapid industrialisation programme led to a distorted
ixxdvkstrial }axxdscape. The authoritariaxx governments deiiberate}y pursvged a policy of
financial and regulatory support to the chaebol which came to dominate the economy at
the expense of developing a vibrant sma}1 and medivgm-sized industrial sector. Showing
characteristics of socialist countries' state-owned enterprises these behemoths were
uitwMing and unab}e to adapt rapidly to the changing economic circvkmstances. Taiwan
was able to avoid the financia} crisis because its small axxd medivgm-sized enterprises
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were better able to exploit the new opportunities which opened up in China throvggh
rapid decisioxx-makixxg and ability to reiocate where necessary.
   The chaebol developed close 1inks with politicians and bureaucrats creating a world
of corruptioxx aitd cronyism enablixxg them to receive preferentia} fixxancial svkpport ixx
the form of loans to pursue the goa} of rapid industrialisation. The govemment's
encovgragement of financiai institvgtions to vkxxderwrite the }oans created an environment
where the chaebol were prepared to take high risk strategies because they felt confident
that in times of troub}e the government wovgid guarantee the }oans. The chaeboi
themselves were organised as groups of companies inter-linked through a system of
cross-shareho}ding axxd loaxx guarantees }eadixxg to a lack of transparency in the system
which not only discouraged foreign investors but also prevented the companies axxd the
authorities from reaiising the perilovks state of many chaebol fixxances untii it was too
late.
   The }oxxg recession vknder Roh Tae Woo and the fear of losing their competitive
edge, sandwiched between techno}ogical inxxovators such as the US and Japan and the
new}y industria}ising iabour-ixxtensive economies, ied the chaebo} to foilow a high risk
strategy of massive investment and expansion in the 1990s through mergers and
acquisitioxxs as weil as ixxcreased production faci}ities predomixxantly ixx estab}ished
indvgstrial sectors rather thaxx innovative ones reducixxg profitabi}ity as they competed
against each other in already satvkrated markets. These compaxxies reached daxxgerous
debt/eqvgity ratios of a}most fovgr hvgndred percent at the time of the crisis.
   As giobal raitkings showedi Korean corporatioxxs were also iosixxg their competitive
edge because of other factors. There had been a major irwestment in research axxd
deveiopment jumpixxg from O.77 percent of GDP in 1980 to 2.4 percent ixx 1994 but in reai
terms the $9.8 billion in X994 }agged far behind the US which spent $X60 billion and
Japan $134 billion in 1993.2
   Another key factor to the sharp decline in profitability was the rapid increase in
the cost of wages after the moves towards democracy in 1987.
   Labour has a history of strong activism since the formation of the South Korean
state. When Park Chung Hee came to power ixx 1961 he svgppressed iabour activism
uxxder his pro-business rapid industrialisation drive. He created axx umbrella union
organisation, the FKTU, based oxx industries. A}}egedly ixxdependent aitd safegvkarding
the interests of its members, it was in fact a mouthpiece for govemment support of big
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business. Radical }abour activists were exclvgded and independent unions baxxned resulting
in a weak organisation which lacked svkpport among the workixxg classes. The chaebo}
created their own unions outside the FKTU which also helped to weaken and divide
}abovgr.
   Under Chvgn Doo Hwan the anti-}abour laws were further strengthened, closing
previous }oopholes such as `third party' ixxvolvement in dispvgtes, barrixxg workers from
having more thaxx one vgnioxx axxd baxxning unions from po}itical activity.
   Dvgring the period of rapid indvgstria}isation aitd an export-driven ecoxxomy labovgr
was asked to sacrifice now for a better tomorrow. As }ong as the economy delivered
growth and an ever-improving staxxdard of livixxg the authoritariaxx regimes of Park and
his successors were able to control opposition within labour. The end of authoritarian
rule in 1987 opened the door for suppressed iabour discontent and activism to come out
in the open. There fo}lowed an explosion of work stoppages and strikes for higher wage
demands which resvgked ixx aiienation of the }abovkr movement from the genera} public as
indvgstrial action threatened to derai} the economy.
   Leading the demand for higher wages were the chaeboi unions. Simiiar to the
industrial structvgre, the union movement was dominated by the chaebol unions who
were ab}e to exp}oit the weakness of the chaebol - the interdependence of grovgp
structure. Like the British car industry of the 60s and 70s a strike or work stoppage in
one svgbsidiary would affect the whole group. Chaeboi management gave in rather than
face crippling losses through strikes. Wages and other benefits increased rapidly. The
rate of increase of vgnit labour cost was 8.3 percent in 1994 compared to O.8 percent in
Japan and 2.4 percent in Taiwan. The average month}y wage ixx 1987 was $400, $1000 in
1992 axxd $1500 in 1997.3 However, the increase in wages axxd benefits created a greater
disparity in incomes between those workers based in chaebol and the workers in small
and medium-sized companies who were not ixx a positioit to make the same kind of
demands as the chaebol vgnions. The wage ratio gap between smaller companies and
chaebol was ninety percent in 1986 axxd seventy-one percent in 1991.4
   Although higher wage demaxxds did contribvgte to the }oss of competitiveness ixx
Koreait indvkstry, in some }abovkr-intensive industries svgch as c}othing and textiles axxd
the }ess labour-intensive indvgstries of semi-conductors and machinery Korea retained its
competitive edge. Also 1987 was the worst year for labovgr dispvgtes with 3,749 cases,
drastically reducing thereafter with on}y X44 in 1993 and 78 ixx 1997.5
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Goverrmmewnt, Finarmegal instgtutEowns, Bwwreawneraey armd CEvgl Soegety
Sovgth Korea is an example of a successfvgl `demodisaster' state which is attempting to
change to a `demoprosperity' paradigm of govemment.
   The `demoprosperity' paradigm svgpports the idea that only through liberal
democratic structvgres caxx a state deveiop a successfvgi ecoitomy in the long term. Libera}
democratic institvgtions and practices are essentia} for the development of a free market
econemy. Key eiements of a iiberai democratic strvgcture and free market econemy are
the respect for individual rights, liberties and the rvgle of law as well as the
establishment of a system of checks axxd coxxtrols making the state less ixxtrusive bvkt
also more accountable, responsive and transparent in its actions.6 The paradigm is in
essence the Western modei of capitaiism, as epitomised by the Americait state.
   According to the `demodisaster' paradigm or `avgthoritarian prosperity' theory, the
 `demoprosperity' paradigm is suitable for ixxdvgstrial states which have matvgre
democratic institutions but is a poor model for developing covgntries to follow. Only
through an authoritariaxx po}itica} system caxx a deve}oping country instigate the kind of
ecoxxomic policies which will lead to a rapid process of industrialisation. Democracy, oxx
the coxxtrary, becavgse it encovkrages debate and differences of opinioxx caxx iead to
stalemate in the political decision-makixxg process and potential ixxstability, even chaos
withixx the system. Moreover, interest grovgps are ab}e to iobby and influence decision-
making in their favour at the expense of the majority distortixxg markets and
weakening overa}} economic performance.7
   Under the svgccessive democratica}}y elected governments of Roh Tae Woo and Kim
Youxxg Sam, Sovgth Korea strvggg}ed to ixxitiate the change from a `demodisaster' state
to a `demoprosperity' state as economic coxxditions clashed with the desire to introdvgce
reforms.
   Under Roh Tae Woo South Korea experienced a }ong recession as Korean companies
struggied to sell their products during a globai dowxxturit, increasixxg protectioxxism as
well as competition from new}y indvgstria}izing economies. Economic performaxxce also
suffered becavkse of democratisatioxx as iabour tested its new-found freedoms axxd because
of Roh's inconsistent economic po}icy as he vaci}}ated between reforms to }ibera}ise
Korea's economy aitd efforts to heip ixxdvgstry out of the recession.
   in 1993 Kim Young Sam succeeded him promising more rapid deregu}ation of the
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economy and democratic reforms under the banner of `segyehwa' as Korea prepared to
enter the `rich man's ciub' of OECD countries. Under his government the economy
recovered posting credib}e economic growth with reduced inflation and unemp}oyment
bvkt the improved economic performance was engineered by a growing movgntain of
foreign debt as Korean industry pursued expansion. The foreign debt rose from $43.9
bi}}ion in 1993 to $160.7 billioxx in 1996 akhovkgh improved somewhat in 1997 to $153 bii-
lion.8 The high build up of foreign debt was matched by a major drop in foreign
reserves from $20.2 bi}lion in 1993 to $12.4 biilion in 1997.9 At the peak of the crisis
when reserves were needed to prop vgp the economy there was less than $8 bil}ioxx
avaiiable which led to the liqvgidity crisis which brovkght the Sovgth Korean economy to
its knees.
   The financial crisis of 1997 which resuked from the reckless indvkstriai expaxxsioxx
bui}t oxx movgntains of debt was xxot the first time that South Korea had shown itse}f
willixxg to take risks with the economy to achieve growth and to stay competitive.
   Beginning with Park Chvgng Hee economic policies were instigated which led to
rapid industria}isatioit and economic growth but in the 1970s his push for
industrialisatioxx based on heavy and chemical ixxdustries kxxown as the Yvgshin period
akhovggh achieving high economic growth created chroitic cvgrrent accovknt deficits as
we}} as high inf}atioxx which coupled with risixxg oil prices and ixxternational interest
rates almost cavksed the economy to fail. The fact the econemy did not fai} rebouxxding
strongly under Chun Doo Hwan may have helped to reinforce the belief that the Korean
ecoitomic svkccess story would continvge indefinitely. Had the ecoxxomy failed then,
possib}y the same errors in economic po}icy and the comp}acency showxx by both
govemment aitd industry in the 1990s wovgid not have taken place.
   The Kim administration proved to be fairly incompetent in handling the economy.
Kim himseif knew little about economic affairs and instead ieft the running of the
economy to his aides. There was no continuity of economic policy as he constantly
changed persoxxne1 in the cabinet- the average tenvgre in office of the deputy prime
minister in charge of finance and economy was eight months.
   in their attempts to meet the reqvkirements of the Urvkguay Rovknd of worid trade
negotiations and admission into the OECD they introdvgced po}icies to deregulate the
econemy which had been poorly thovkght out. First, they abolished the Economic
Planning Board by incorporating it ixxto the Ministry of Finance and Economy in the
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xxame of rationalisation. The EPB, a key element in the developmental state p}anning
system, had been responsible for the svgpervisioit of the ecoitomy. Second, they
abandoned the system of five-year ecoxxomic plans. Third, they accelerated the
curtaiiment of selective industry policy which Roo Tae Woo had started. These po}icy
decisions removed key strvgctures of the state's ability to influence ecoxxomic policy and
to monitor the ecoitomy accvkrateiy. This proved crvgcial as ixxdvgstry xxo ioitger had
restraints on po}icy decisions resu}ting in over-capacity of production axxd falling
profitabiiity.
   Kim Young Sam ixxtroduced measures to deregulate the fixxancial institutions to
meet international standards but his reforms did not go far enovggh. Instead of creating
a finaxxcial system which was proper}y supervised and transparent in its dealings, the
old industry-bvksiness iinks remained. He created new merchant baxxks aitd lifted
restrictioxxs on borrowing which the chaebol took fu}1 advantage of in their efforts to
remaixx competitive. They acqvkired contro}1ing shares in the merchant banks and had
direct access to borrowing abroad. The financia} institutions in tum did not qvgestion
the }oan reqvgirements of the chaebo} creating a mountain of debt which was
predominantly short-term ixx foreign borrowing and long-term in }ending. Previovgsly
where the government wovgid have monitored the sitvgatioit aitd taken corrective
measures, this time it was oblivious to the perilous state of both chaebo} and financia}
institutions. The high financiai costs of servicing the short-term debt fvkrther redvkced
the profitability of the chaebo}.
   Kim's goverxxment aiso failed to end the ciose lixxks between politicians aitd credit
allocatioxx, in fact, the situation worsened after the curtai}ment of the se}ective ixxdustry
policy as chaebo} scrambled to maintain their share of government money. Whereas
previous}y chaebol had been treated equally by industrial sector, some were now seen as
been `closer' to the administratioxx than others, in particular the maxxufacturing ixxdvkstry
which had been re}ative}y free of croxxy practices became sullied in the public eye.
   Haxxbo Steei was a good example. despite poor business prospects they were ab}e to
raise }oans to build a new p}axxt throvggh their political connections. In fact the Hanbo
Stee} baitkrvgptcy had major repercvgssions for the Kim administratioxx as Kim's soxx,
Kim Hyvgn Choi, as well as other politicians within and ovgtside the administration were
implicated ixx the scaxxda} destroying the image the Kim administratioit had tried to
cvgkivate of being above the corruption and s}eaze politics of previous govemments. The
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damage done to the authority of the Kim administration hampered its ability to deal
with the crisis as it vknfo}ded.
   Another factor which inhibited the competitiveness of the chaebol was bvgreavgcratic
red tape. In 1994 it took 530 days to buiid a piant in Korea once the decisioxx had been
made. The company needed to prepare reels of documents and approval from covgntless
government departments. in contrast it took oniy 145 days in the US, 188 days in
Taiwaxx axxd even in Japan with a bloated bureaucracy it took on}y 284 days.iO
   The Ministry of Finance and Economy came vkxxder a barrage of criticism dvkrixxg the
crisis not jvgst for fai}ing to monitor the huge buildup of debt, it also failed to produce
accurate statistics oit the foreign debt creatixxg additioita} panic in the foreigxx exchange
markets even after the IMF bai}out had been agreed.
   The move towards a `demoprosperity' state also meant Kim Young Sam was more
sensitive to pvgb}ic opinion axxd the media which also led to prevaricatioxx when strong
ieadership was reqvkired. He tried to introduce }abovgr reforms to end `lifetime empioy
ment' practices and make it easier for companies to fire emp}oyees. The tripartite
commission which was set vkp to reach a compromise faiied to deliver. In exasperatioxx
Kim tried to railroad the }aws through the legislature but fai}ed because of oppositioxx
from both iabour and opposition parties. The indvkstriai strife cost the covgntry abovgt $3
bi}}ion ixx lost ovgtput at the beginnixxg of X997 and reduced the popvglarity of the Kim
govemment to a record }ow.
   The case of Kia Motors was another good example. Public opinion went against the
decisioit to iet the grovkp go baitkrvgpt especial}y after it emerged that the depvgty prime
minister, Kang Kyuxxgshik, had an interest in seeing the group fail which wou}d benefit
Samsvgng, a chaeboi he had close ties to. The three-month delay and the fixxai decisioxx
to bai} out the compaxxy sent the wrong signals to foreign investors at a critical
juncture in the developixxg crisis damaging the government's credibiiity fvgrther.
                             External Faetors
The Sovkth-east Asian crisis with the rvgn on the Thai baht is regarded as one of the
root causes of the financial collapse of so many countries in the regioxx bvgt the role of
Japan ixx brixxging initial instabi}ity to the regioxx caxxnot be uxxderestimated.
   in the X970s and 1980s the Asia-Pacific region was the darling of ixxvestors as the
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region experienced phenomenal rates of growth. The main engine for that growth was
Japan which had ied the way ixx deve}opmental state econemic policy. The 1980s saw
Japanese exports create massive trade surp}uses. Globa} recessioxx axxd resentment
against the way the Japanese were f}ooding markets with iitt}e reciprocity in retum ied
to growing protectionist sentiment ixx the West as the fear grew that Japan wou}d
coxxqvger the world. Resentment was also directed at other Asia-Pacific covgntries svkch as
Korea which were fo}lowing the Japanese model of success. Agreement was reached
among ieading industrial nations to ailow the yen to strengthen in vaiue to heip reduce
the trade surp}uses. The immediate effect was to swell company va}ues and profits
leading to a giut of money which the companies used in wild speculatioit ixx real estate
and the stock market. At the same time the govemment fearing recession had eased
monetary restraints makixxg borrowing easier. The domestic stock market and reai
estate reached urwea}istic and unsvgstainab}e levels. When the government final}y moved
to restrain borrowixxg it ied to the bvkrsting of the econemic bvkbb}e. The stock market
plummeted from a high of over 30,OOO to less than half. Companies were svgddenly
sadd}ed with }arge debts and negative eqvkity, the banks were overburdened with iarge
xxon-performing }oans. Since then the Japanese economy has struggled to come ovgt of
the recession and def}ationary spiral.
   With the main economic engine cripp}ed, with foreign investor confidence dented, the
rest of the region was more vvglnerable to an economic downturn. Not only was Japan
the main engine of growth for the region it was also a major player ixx foreign direct
investment aitd government assistance. The Japanese banks aiready sadd}ed with huge
non-performing loans were hopixxg investment in the region would he}p to bail them out
of their own difficukies but they were also very nervovks and ready to pvgll ovgt at the
first sigxx of difficuky.
   The Sovgth-east Asian crisis caused by a loss of confidence among ixxvestors in first
Thailand and then e}sewhere created a herd mentality mainly led by Japanese
institutional investors who cal}ed in their short-term doliar loans. This was particvklarly
true ixx the case of Korea.
   The IMF aitd World Bank also played a roie in inadvertently bringixxg about the
financia} crisis in 1997. Like the Korean goverxxment it initia}ly denied that Korea was
ixx financiai difficulties which did xxothing to calm investor confideitce as the Koreaxx
cvgrrency }ost value and the stock market dived reducing company assets and making
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}oan repayments doubly difficu}t }eadixxg to further bankruptcies.
   in Augvkst 1997 the Japanese authorities proposed a $100 billioit baiiout fuitd to heip
Asian ecoxxomies in difficuky but the US torpedoed the idea because it did not want to
see the establishment of a rivai to cha}}enge existing institvktions svkch as the Wor}d
Bank and IMF which were westem control}ed. Also the US was afraid that to estab}ish
the fvknd wovgid reqvgire major capitai withdrawa}s from the US as the world's leading
debtor natioxx fvgrther destab}isixxg the world finaxxcial markets.
   Another factor which contribvkted to Korea's ecoxxomic demise was pressure oxx
Korea to liberalise its markets through the WTO axxd OECD organisations in the name
of globa}isatioit. Kim embraced the idea and went about ha}f-dismant}ing the
deve}opmental state withovgt putting other structvgres in place to replace the positive
aspects of the system.
                                C o rm e ku sgo rm
The immediate cavkse of the Korean financiai crisis can be put down to three key
factors: the large short-term foreign debt of Koreaxx chaebo} and financial institutions,
the high-profile baxxkruptcies of }eadixxg chaeboi svgch as Hanbo Stee} axxd Kia, and the
Sovgth-east Asiaxx fixxancial crisis which all came together to cause investor confidence to
evaporate ieading to pressure on the Korean currency axxd stockmarket axxd the ca}}ing
in of the short-term loans therefore generating a major liqvgidity crisis at a time when
Korea's foreign reserves were at a perilously inadeqvkate }evel to svgpport the ecoxxomy.
As I have tried to argue there were many uxxderlying factors which created the
environment for the financial disaster. First, the government of Kim Young Sam proved
itse}f incompetent in economic matters throvggh its inadequate planning of reform in the
process of dismant1ing the developmentai state. The reforms were itot oniy badly
planned, they a}so did not go far enough leaving the who}e system ixx a kind of limbo
state of semi-reform. Like a bad mechanic he dismantled the car but forgot how to put
it back again.
   He failed to initiate the reforms needed becavkse of the pressure of vested interests
and pub}ic opinion. When he attempted to stamp his authority by trying to bulldoze
through key iabour reforms, he failed miserably leaving his government weak to deai
with the impendixxg crisis.
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   Although he revived the economy after the 1ong recession uxxder Roh Tae Woo, the
recovery was based on a mountain of foreign short-term debt axxd iitadequate foreigit
reserves.
   Secoxxd, the chaebois played a major part in the events of 1997. They adopted
finaxxcial strategies which lowered their profitability and made them very vu}nerable to
extemai pressvkres. They scrambied to borrow easy money in short-term foreign loans
to promote a risky strategy of rapid corporate expansion which main}y consisted of
mergers axxd acquisitions and over-prodvkction depressing prices and lowering
profitability. They built up levels of debt which were vgnsustainable in the misp}aced
belief that they were too big to fali aitd that the government would bail them out in
times of trovgb}e. Their intricate webs of cross shareholdixxg axxd loan gvgaraxxtees masked
the true extent of the debt leveis vkntil it was too late. Their cosy re}ations with both
govemment and bureaucracy helped continue corrupt practices and cronyism which
vkxxdermined the governmeitt's ability to govern.
   Third, labour contributed to the growing unprofitability of the chaebo}s by ho}ding
them to ransom, exploitixxg their weakness, their interdependence, to demaitd ever higher
wages and conditions which in the long-term reduced their competitiveness against rival
natioxxs. Labovgr aiso showed intransigence in accepting reforms of the labovgr iaws
which threatened their interests but which would in the long-term benefit the covgntry.
   Fourth, the financiai institvgtions showed themselves to be very fiscaily irresponsib}e
by having ixxadeqvgate checks made of the financia} viability of potential clients axxd their
ioan requests aitd ailowixxg the sitvkation to deve}op where they were vvklnerable to the
recall of short-term foreign }oans with long-term domestic loans which were inadeqvgate
to cover a svkdden withdrawal. When the crisis hit they were caught ixx a liqvgidity trap
with many non-performing loans.
   Fifth, akhough Kim was to blame for dismaxxtlixxg certain bvkreavkcratic institvgtions
which had been the backbone of the developmenta} state, it is also true the bureavgcracy,
ixx particular, the Ministry of Fixxance and Economy, proved itse}f incompetent ixx
handling the economy. Reforms of the bvgreavgcracy did not go far enough to remove the
ieveis of red tape which hindered the competitiveness of Koreait bvksiness.
   Sixth, civi} society begaxx to p}ay a greater ro}e in balance and checks against the
govemment causing para}ysis of decision-making. Public disapproval of the Kia Motors
bankruptcy led the govemment to eventually back down but affected foreign irwestor
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confidence at the same time. Labour used its new found freedoms to resist reforms by
the government.
   Fina}}y, the demise of the largest economy in the region made the other weaker
ecoxxomies more vvglnerable to external factors. The co}lapse of foreign ixxvestor
confidence in the regioxx, the domino effect of the South-east Asian crisis played its part
in the financial crisis in Korea.
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